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[Below are selected highlights from two separate interviews with Ruben Zamora, leader of the
Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR). Zamora recently returned to El Salvador after years
in exile. The first interview with Pensamiento Proprio, took place in April and was published
in June. (Pensamiento Proprio is a publication of the Regional Coordination for Economic and
Social Research of Central America and the Caribbean-CRIES, Managua.) The second interview,
conducted by Radio Farabundo Marti del FMLN (RFM), was printed in the RFM's June-July bulletin.
(Copies of RFM bulletins are available at the following address: RFM, Apdo. Postal 57-194, Mexico
06501 DF.)] From interview with Pensamiento Proprio: PP: What is your evaluation of the March 20
election results? Zamora: For the first time in eight years the elections have not worked to legitimize
the government's counterinsurgency program. They also increased governmental instability by
creating a Legislative Assembly in which no party has a majority which will make decision-making
very complicated. The presidency itself is hurt not only by the failure of the Christian Democrats
(DC), but also because President Duarte was involved with the failed candidacy of his son Alejandro
for mayor of San Salvador. Finally, the electoral results indicate that an ARENA victory is possible in
next year's presidential elections. ARENA received 43% of the vote, up from the 30% they normally
obtain, signifying the extreme right's return to government through the electoral process. We think
that the bourgeoisie will unite around ARENA and form a rightist front in support of its presidential
candidate next year. PP: Can the Christian Democrats recover? Zamora: The Christian Democrats
have suffered a heavy political blow and are now at a crossroads. If they continue along the same
path they will definitely lose the presidency, so they must change, but how? They would have to
move to the left but first must clean up the party internally and seriously confront the problem
of dialogue and negotiation. A party housecleaning, however, will be practically impossible now
that the party's most corrupt sector has consolidated itself and named Rey Prendes as presidential
candidate. And moving towards dialogue and negotiations would mean distancing themselves
from the US counterinsurgency program at precisely the moment when the government is weakest
and is most dependent on US support. I do not foresee the DC overcoming this crisis in the next
year. PP: How will the elections effect the popular movement? Zamora: It seems that political
alternatives have narrowed, and the only immediate option presented to the people is ARENA's
project. Meanwhile, possibilities for the FDR and the Democratic Convergence to push forward
the policy of searching for and building a national, popular consensus have increased. ARENA will
probably maintain the facade of openness to dialogue so as not to hurt its successful new image.
The Christian Democrats, given their crisis, will search for new levels of unity and consensus among
democratic and progressive forces. In addition, many from the middle class, as well as the popular
classes, will try to prevent an ARENA victory in 1989. These are people who voted for ARENA in
the last elections as a protest against the government but did not expect such a sweeping triumph.
They know that if ARENA wins the presidency, ARENA will return again to what it always was
an ultra-right party with strong terrorist tendencies. PP: Does the electoral result signify a turn
to the right by the people? Zamora: I believe this is a false interpretation. Many people voted for
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a party that, at least in its campaign rhetoric, moved from right to center. ARENA projected an
image, that they themselves defined as center-right, abandoned their anti-communist slogans,
spoke more of dialogue and reforms, and defined itself as a democratic party. PP: What has been the
reaction of the Armed Forces to the elections? Zamora: Divisions that already existed have widened
between the political-military leadership (the High Command and the Minister and Vice-minister
of Defense) and the colonels in the field. Some colonels closely allied with ARENA feel that its hardline positions of closing political spaces have been legitimized and also that the High Command,
which is closely tied in with the US counterinsurgency plan, has been weakened. The overall effect
is a major crisis in the officer corps. This is very dangerous because it can lead to a closing down of
the already narrow political maneuvering room and to an increase in repression and human rights
violations. PP: What does Duarte's downfall mean to the US? Zamora: In the wake of the elections,
the US is trying to mask the negative outcome and argue that democracy was advanced because
an opposition party won in a legitimate vote. But this is a purely formal position. The real problem
for the US is that its counterinsurgency plan has collapsed. The Reagan administration counted on
having two successive Christian Democratic governments so that later, in 1994, the system would
become bipartisan. The elections pushed events forward. Now instead of six more years to develop
their political plan, they have only one, and this year is an especially difficult one for the US because
of its own electoral campaign. In addition, this year has been disastrous for US foreign policy in
Central America. It started with problems in El Salvador and Nicaragua, has added Honduras and
Panama, and has resolved none of them. PP: Will the US pressure for some kind of cooperation
between ARENA and the Christian Democrats? Zamora: Right now, the US embassy is playing the
field and has no definite position on who to support in the presidential elections. For the moment, it
has launched a campaign to convince key forces in the US that ARENA is no longer a terrorist group
but a new political party. Accordingly, it is promoting ARENA's secretary-general, Alfredo Cristiani.
At the same time, however, the embassy wants to maintain support for the Christian Democrats,
and I would not be surprised to see them search for a candidate to the left of the party, someone
from the progressive and democratic forces represented by the Democratic Convergence. Obviously,
they would demand that we break with the FMLN and in that way turn us into a caboose on the
Christian Democrat train, perhaps in alliance with the National Conciliation Party. PP: What are
the FDR's plans? Zamora: Now is the time for the FDR, as well as for the Democratic Convergence,
to rethink our strategies. The project of building a popular national consensus was designed for a
relatively long period of two and a half years, but now, the Democratic Convergence must make
a decision in two or three months about what it will do regarding the presidential elections. PP:
Will you participate in the elections? Zamora: Obviously, this is an option open to the Democratic
Convergence, and we sense many anxieties and expectations among those with whom we are in
contact over what we plan to do. If fraud was committed in the last elections against the winner,
ARENA, which is inside the counterinsurgency plan, you can imagine the few guarantees that the
Democratic Convergence, which does not even control the electoral mechanisms, would have.
However, there is also the danger that if the DC does not participate, although it would be an honest
political force, it would be an irrelevant one in the political life of the nation. PP: Must you make
this decision in accordance with the FMLN? Zamora: Our political parties belong to the FDR which
is allied to the FMLN. The FDR-FMLN alliance is still necessary, now more than ever, given the
complexity of the situation and the determination to unite all the popular, democratic, revolutionary,
and patriotic forces. A decision of this nature needs to be discussed taking into account both the
FMLN's and FDR's interests. This is normal procedure in any alliance of heterogenous forces trying
to find consensus. PP: What are the possibilities of popular insurrection? Zamora: Insurrection
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is possible, and not because only the left believes it to be so. The other day I read a document
from the Army High Command outlining the real possibilities of an insurrection caused by the
crisis in the counter-insurgency program and the dramatic economic decline. The point is to see
if conditions for an insurrection are or are not present and to measure the balance of forces that
will or will not permit the development of the electoral process here and now in El Salvador. In
this sense, the FMLN, like the FDR and the Democratic Convergence, has to make a decision. PP:
Your party thinks that the conditions for insurrection are here now? Zamora: Frankly, we don't
think it is possible in the short term. Eventually yes, if the contradictions worsen, but we don't see
in the masses any predisposition to rebellion. I am referring to the urban sectors where terror still
prevails. From interview with RFM: RFM: Please comment on the June announcement that FDRFMLN representatives will hold direct talks with members of the US Democratic Party. Zamora:
These talks have to be seen in the context of a series of talks which the FDR-FMLN has been holding
with certain foreign politicians and political groups. An FMLN delegation recently held talks with
President Arias of Costa Rica. I have just returned from Europe where I met with the Italian Foreign
Minister, the Foreign Office in London, and the Socialist International. In the case of the United
States, we spoke with representatives of Senate majority leader and with the majority leader in the
House of Representatives. We feel that this is an opportune moment for developing these kinds of
contacts given that the acute state of crisis for the Reagan administration's project for El Salvador
and the Central American region is abundantly clear. In a few months time, elections are to be
held in the US, and there is a definite chance that the Democratic Party may win. Therefore, quite
logically, they are beginning to look for new analyses, new perspectives, and want to know exactly
what the FDR-FMLN proposes, given that we are a genuine force in El Salvador without which
no viable solution can be achieved. RFM: What is the FDR-FMLN's answer to the question, "And
after Duarte, what next?" Zamora: When we analyse the impact of his death or withdrawal from the
government, the first point is that it would not constitute a fundamental change for one very simple
reason: Duarte never held real power. At the same time, however, we should not underestimate the
significance of Duarte's departure, since he was an important part of the Reagan administration's
project. In this sense, I feel that there will be an increase in the institutional instability which exists
today. Third, I believe that the military will end up with a greater more direct role in the day-today running or direct management of El Salvador. RFM: About the FDR-FMLN proposal to the
government for dialogue including the Armed Forces and political parties... Zamora: Different
sectors of society are increasingly searching for new alternatives. Our experience over the past
four months has been highly positive: professional sectors, which before the elections expressed
enormous doubts about the issue of a national consensus, have, in our opinion, been motivated to
search for this type of alternative. We also find that the demand among trade unions for a political
solution is not just coming from those progressive unions such as the UNTS (National Union of
Salvadoran Workers) or the CTS (Salvadoran Workers Confederation), but from pro-government
and pro-US unions as well. The same can not be said for the government. The government's reply
has been a definitive rejection of dialogue as conceived of in our proposal, arguing that now is
not the best time for talks given their internal conflicts. Here we see once again that the Christian
Democrat government has a closed mind vis-a-vis dialogue, and that it will only change this attitude
when it thinks that it can draw some propaganda value, rather than real results from such a move.
As for the political parties in the Legislative Assembly, at first they said they would study the
proposal, but later they did not give any definite reply, either for or against.
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